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ALTERNATIVES TO UTILIZATION OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM
TO MEET SOCIAL PROBLEMS
PAUL R. MCDANIEL*
As the urgency of meeting the nation's pressing social problems
mounts, it is not surprising that proposals to utilize the tax system
as a means of funding the various responsive efforts proliferate. The
effort to reform our federal income tax system that culminated in
the Tax Reform Act of 1969' shed considerable light on the poten-
tial of, and limitations inherent in, the use of the tax system as a tool
for meeting social needs. Proposals to use the tax system to meet
non-tax objectives must be evaluated by Americans in their dual roles
as taxpayers and as citizens concerned with solving social problems.
An informed judgment thus requires an understanding of the impact
on the tax system—and hence on all taxpayers—of using tax mea-
sures for solving such problems
The great cost of dealing with pollution, unemployment, educa-
tion, housing, health care and other contemporary problems has led
many concerned individuals and political leaders to examine and pro-
pose the use of what are generally referred to by their proponents
as "tax incentives." Consideration of the merits of these proposals
is better undertaken by examining a somewhat different concept—
"tax expenditures." The phrase "tax incentives" tends to beg one of
the significant questions to be answered in any federally financed proj-
ect which requires cooperation of the private sector. Will persons
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of the Oklahoma Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; formerly
Special Assistant to Senator Albert Gore and Acting Associate Tax Legislative Counsel,
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1 Pub. L. No. 91-172, Dec. 30, 1969, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 509-822 (1969)
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in private enterprise in fact be motivated to address themselves to
a given problem, such as pollution, if federal funds are made avail-
able? Utilization of the concept of tax incentives by definition
implies an affirmative answer to this critical question. Also, some
theorists posit the federal income tax as a disincentive, so that selec-
tive modification of the tax burden for a given purpose would merely
constitute removal of this disincentive effect, not a positive incentive.
In this discussion, then, it will be more helpful to refer to the neu-
tral and more descriptive term "tax expenditures." After outlining
the tax expenditure concept and the impact of tax expenditures in
general on the federal income tax system, this article will analyze
the implications of the use of tax expenditures to solve three social
problems: education, pollution and housing.
I. THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
A. The Analytical Framework
Tax expenditures may take the form of tax deductions, tax cred-
its, deferrals of tax, preferential rates or exemptions from tax. Many
of the deductions in the tax Code arose out of a conscious effort to
encourage a particular type of activity. The deduction for charitable
contributions' appears to be such a provision. On the other hand,
many of the present tax preferences have arisen more by accident
than by design, frequently because policymakers or administrators
did not fully recognize the implications of their actions. The deduc-
tion for percentage depletion" and preferential tax rules for farmers'
are examples of this kind of special tax benefit. Interestingly, these
latter tax preferences are now defended by their beneficiaries as
needed incentives for the particular economic activity affected.
The adverse effects of these tax preferences on the equity of
the federal income tax system have long been recognized by tax the-
orists.' But another consequence has only recently been recognized
and brought to public attention—that these tax preferences in fact
constitute public expenditures just as much as direct expenditures of
federal funds resulting from the normal congressional appropriations
process. This analysis was articulated by former Secretary of the
Treasury Joseph Barr in testimony before the Joint Economic Corn-
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, a 170.
8 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, U 611-14.
4 See, e.g., ht. Rev. Code of 1954, El 175, 182. For an excellent discussion of these
rules, see Davenport, A Bountiful Tax Harvest, 48 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1969).
6 See, e.g., Blum, Federal Tax Reform—Twenty Questions, 41 Taxes 672 (1963);
Kurtz, Federal Income Tax Reform—Their Use and Misuse, U. So. Cal. 1968 Tax Inst.
1; Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to Urban Problems, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 647
(1969); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970).
868
FEDERAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM
mittee in January, 1969, 6 and in the 1968 Annual Report of the.
Secretary of the Treasury.' Simply stated, the Treasury thesis is that
a tax preference item can be viewed as if the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice had collected the tax from the taxpayer claiming the tax benefit
and then Congress had appropriated the funds for payment in the
amount of the tax preference for the specified purpose.
The inequity of tax preferences can be seen by examining the
deduction for interest paid on home mortgagess—a provision which
has been considered an incentive to encourage home ownership. This
tax benefit, when viewed as a tax expenditure, in effect says that if
a married couple has more than $200,000 of income, then for each
$100 of interest liability that is incurred on their home mortgage, the
federal government will pay $70 to the savings and loan association
if the homeowner will contribute $30. This result, of course, merely
reflects the after-tax impact of the interest deduction for a 70 per-
cent bracket taxpayer. But for the taxpayer in the 20 percent bracket,
present tax expenditure policy provides that the homeowner must
pay the lending institution $80 in interest in order to obtain a $20
matching grant from the federal government. And if a person with
little income who does not earn enough to pay federal income tax
buys a house, the federal government will not contribute anything
through the tax expenditure mechanism to assist in his interest pay-
ments.
Tax expenditure analysis thus confronts the policymaker with
the question whether the result described represents a rational ap-
proach to encourage home ownership by our citizens. More pointedly,
would Congress enact a system which would provide for direct pay-
ment of the government's share of the interest expense in the propor-
tions that result under our present tax rules?
Other tax preferences can be similarly recast as tax expenditures.
Thus, the percentage depletion allowance° can be viewed as a tax
expenditure to encourage drilling activity; the preferential rate for
capital gains" as a subsidy for entrepreneurial business activity; and
the medical expense deduction" as a federal program to share medical
costs. The mode of federal participation in a particular transaction
Hearings on the 1969 Economic Report of the President Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-44 (1969).
7 1968 Sec'y Treas. Ann. Rep. on the State of the Finances 326-30. For a debate on
the validity of the Treasury thesis, see Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies"
in the National Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Ex-
penditure Budget—Response to Professor Bittker, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 528 (1969).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 	 163.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, H 611-14.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1201.
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 213.
,
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through tax expenditures may vary depending on the form in which
the tax benefit is cast. The federal contribution may resemble a low
cost loan program, an interest subsidy or a direct or matching grant
system. But a tax expenditure may always be recast in the form of
a direct non-tax financial benefit conferred by the government.
B. Identifying the Tax Expenditure
Once the operation of a tax expenditure has been described, it
becomes necessary to differentiate between provisions in the tax laws
which constitute tax expenditures and provisions which are an inte-
gral part of the tax structure. In order to establish differentiating
criteria one fundamental judgment must be accepted—a tax system
has an internal logic that results from the values society has deter-
mined inhere in a fair tax system. Society may employ different
values in choosing its variety of tax systems. For example, the federal
individual income tax system expresses society's judgment that this
fundamental tax should be progressive; the more income one receives,
the higher rate of tax he should pay on his last dollar of income. A
different value judgment underlies sales taxes, however, which bear
on all persons in proportion to their taxable purchases regardless of
income. The point is that certain criteria can be articulated which
will differentiate provisions that merely involve a working out of the
implications of society's judgments about the nature of the tax sys-
tem from provisions which in fact are antithetical to the fundamental
precept of the particular tax system. 12
Within the context of the federal income tax system, the follow-
ing criteria are suggested to identify tax expenditures:
1. Any item determined to be income that is exempt from
tax.
2. Any item that reduces progressivity.
3. Any item that can be restated as a program of direct
financial assistance without violating the precepts of a
progressive income tax system.
These three principles overlap, but each deals with a somewhat
different problem. The first criterion deals with the question of ex-
emptions from tax. In the federal income tax system, society has
chosen to tax "income." Thus, variations in the tax load resulting
from determinations of what kinds of receipts are treated as income
do not constitute tax expenditures. A determination by Congress or
the courts that a given receipt of money or property constitutes a
return of capital, and not income, does no violence to the internal
12 The analysis that follows relies in substantial part on the formulation developed
by Professor Surrey in the article cited in note 5 supra.
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logic of the income tax system: Similarly, the rule that a recovery
of taxes previously paid does not constitute income is entirely con-
sistent with the logic of an income tax system, and exclusion of such
an item from the tax base will do no violence to progressivity,
since this conclusion is consistent with an economic view that there
has been no net accretion in wealth that would justify treating the
item as income." On the other hand, once an item is determined to
be income, such as interest on state and local bonds, then exemption
from tax violates the logical demands of an income tax system. Ex-
emption of state and local bond interest from tax,' therefore, would
constitute a tax expenditure under any income tax system whether
progressive or proportional.
The second criterion is that any provision in the federal income
tax laws that reduces progressivity constitutes a tax expenditure.
This principle would also apply to tax exemption once the definitional
hurdle is cleared, but is useful primarily in analyzing deductions and
deferrals of tax. Business deductions' and deductions related to the
cost of producing income" are not tax expenditures. The internal
logic of a tax on net income dictates that these deductions do not
adversely affect progressivity, but rather flow from society's judg-
ment that the tax is imposed on net income. This second criterion is
concerned with three types of tax provisions: (1) personal deductions,
such as charitable contributions," (2) tax provisions which alter the
timing of deductions so as to permit a mismatching of income and
the expense of producing that income, such as accelerated deprecia-
tion of real estate," and (3) deductions in amounts which exceed
the cost of producing income, such as percentage depletion." Each
of these three provisions does violence to the fundamental precepts
of a progressive income tax system in two ways. First, these provi-
sions permit two taxpayers with the same amount of economic income
to pay different amounts of tax. Second, a person with a larger income
may pay the same or a lower amount of tax than another taxpayer
with less income.
The third criterion is that a tax expenditure is any item which
13 No attempt is made here to define the processes by which agreement is reached
that a particular receipt constitutes income. For purposes of this article the Simons
definition is accepted as normative: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in
the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question." H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 50 (1938).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103.
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
16 IM. Rev. Code of 1954, § 212.
17 IM. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 611-14.
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can be restated in terms of a direct government program of financial
assistance, without violating the progressivity concept. The italicized
portion of this criterion is necessary in order to account for rate dif-
ferentials in a progressive tax system. If an exemption of an income
item constitutes a tax expenditure, it might be argued that a rate
differential also constitutes a tax expenditure to the person who pays
at the lower rate. For example, assuming two individuals, one with
an effective tax rate of 50 percent, and the other of 20 percent, would
tax expenditure analysis assert that the 20 percent rate can be viewed
as if the government had collected tax at a 50 percent rate and made
a direct grant back to the lower income individual of the taxes rep-
resented by the 30 percent differential? The answer to this question
is no, because, as so restated, the direct expenditure assumes a prin-
ciple that is directly antithetical to a progressive tax system—a pro-
portional income tax system which utilizes a 50 percent rate. Thus,
under the proposed criterion, the rate differentials in a progressive
tax system do not constitute tax expenditures.
The personal exemption" is another provision which is not con-
ceptually a tax expenditure. The personal exemption simply consti-
tutes a dollar amount of income which is taxed at a zero rate. So
viewed, a basic personal exemption is not a tax expenditure, since
taxing a given amount of income at a zero rate is no more regressive
than taxing it at 1 percent or 14 percent. This point would be patently
clear if the tax system employed negative rates.
On the other hand, the additional exemptions for the elderly 21
and the blind22
 do constitute tax expenditures. These exemptions are
awarded on the basis of a factor unrelated to income, namely, age
or physical condition, and thus violate both the logical integrity of
an income tax system and the principle of progressivity. Also, the
basic personal exemption in present law can be viewed as containing
a partial tax expenditure element to the extent the amount varies with
family size. While it is logically defensible to tax a given amount of
income at a zero rate, the size of that income bracket should not vary
on account of a factor unrelated to income, namely, the size of the
family.23
C. Arguments Against Tax Expenditures
The fundamental argument against tax expenditures from the
standpoint of tax theorists is that each tax preference reduces the
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 151(b), (e).
21 IM. Rev. Code of 1954, § I51(c).
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 151(d).
23 The underlying problem here is, of course, defining the basic economic unit to
be taxed. Is it a single person, a married couple with no children, or some other family
size?
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fairness of the tax system. No tax expenditure has yet been proposed
that avoids this criticism. The tax preferences in the present system,
and those which have been proposed, either provide a greater benefit
to those in the 70 percent bracket than to those in the 20 percent
bracket, or permit different taxpayers with the same income to bear
a dissimilar tax burden on account of factors extraneous to the pro-
duction of income. And, of course, tax incentives provide no benefit
to a person who is not on the tax rolls.
The other major defects cited by opponents of tax expenditures
are by now well known," and will be only mentioned here. The weight
of these objections can be better evaluated in the context of the par-
ticular tax provisions discussed below. Tax expenditures constitute,
as Chairman Mills has asserted, "backdoor" spending," for these
expenditures are insulated from annual congressional review in the
appropriations process. Thus, this form of federal expenditure tends
to remain imbedded in our economic structure long after its useful-
ness or desirability has ceased. Tax expenditures are inefficient to
the extent that they reward taxpayers for engaging in a course of
conduct they would have followed in any event. In addition, funds
may be expended in low rather than high priority areas, since there
is generally no control over allocation of funds.
Tax expenditures, it is also urged, result in a misallocation of
resources, both public and private. In the private sector, tax incen-
tives encourage capital to be utilized in a manner which will maximize
the tax benefit. But the resulting allocation of capital may not be di-
rected to the most efficient or even the most desirable solutions to the
problem addressed. In short, the existence of tax preferences distorts
the normal businessman's decision making process. From a national
standpoint, since tax expenditures are not subject to the appropria-
tions process, tax expenditures automatically assume a role of first
priority for our national expenditures in an amount determined solely
by the beneficiaries of each preference. The 1968 Treasury Study
identified over $40 billion in annual tax expenditures." This is a very
substantial amount of federal funds to expend each year without any
congressional review, especially when these expenditures result in other
taxpayers paying high rates of tax to provide revenues needed for
direct federal programs.
D. Arguments for Tax Expenditures
To list the arguments against expenditures through tax prefer-
ences is in a sense to set forth the arguments in favor of the use of
24 See Surrey, supra note 5.
25 Address by Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, Meeting of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 1968.
25 1968 Sec'y Treas. Ann. Rep. on the State of the Finances 339-40.
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tax incentives. For example, in answer to those who assert that tax
expenditures are not reviewed by Congress, proponents of tax ex-
penditures argue that one of the benefits is that taxpayers can plan
their affairs with the certainty that the rules of the game will not be
quickly changed, and the level of funding will not ride the appro-
priations "roller coaster" which marks so many federal programs
Similarly, it is argued that federal expenditures through tax incen-
tives leave room for private initiative and decision making, free of
bureaucratic constraints and lack of imagination. Tax incentives, so
viewed, represent a commitment to private enterprise in our economic
system, and, if properly structured, need lose little in terms of effi-
ciency or effectiveness. Proponents also argue that tax incentives
are simple and do not involve the red tape that is the hallmark of
federal programs Finally, and of direct interest to the present dis-
cussion, tax incentives can involve private business and individuals
in the solution of the country's social problems.
E. Toward a Resolution of the Conflict
The foregoing analysis of the nature of tax expenditures and the
arguments for and against their use permit certain conclusions. First,
the difference between tax expenditures and direct expenditures is that
the use of tax expenditures will impair the fairness of the income tax
system. Second, any tax expenditure can be translated into and effected
by a direct expenditure of appropriated funds and still satisfy the
asserted advantages of a tax preference. For example, a direct federal
grant or loan program can be drafted and operated as simply, and
with the same degree of freedom from government control as a tax
expenditure, if these are determined to be the overriding criteria for
the program. Third any direct expenditure program can be drafted as
a tax expenditure program in such a way as to avoid the disadvan-
tages that opponents of tax incentives cite. For example, a one-year
termination date can be placed on tax expenditures to insure annual
congressional review in the light of budgetary needs and priority con-
trols. Fourth, it is clear that an argument for tax incentives is not
really an argument for any inherent advantages of federal spending
through the tax system. It is in fact an argument in favor of federal
spending for specific purposes as opposed to less or no federal spend-
ing for those purposes. The asserted advantages of tax incentives are
quite independent of the tax system and can be as easily realized in
a direct expenditure program.
If these conclusions are valid, then the conflict between the two
positions can be seen in more fundamental terms. Those who oppose
use of the tax system to meet social or economic problems do so not
874
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because they oppose expenditure of federal funds for the desired
purpose, but because they do not want to see the funds expended in
a manner which will impinge on one of the fundamental values of
our society—a progressive income tax system.
Proponents of tax incentives, on the other hand, feel that the
social need of the proposed object of the federal expenditure overrides
the value to society of a fair tax system in the particular area of
their concern. It is so important that funds be expended for the pre-
scribed purpose that any means of securing the funds must be adopted.
But as social needs multiply, these demands in the aggregate can
undermine society's value judgment that a progressive tax system
is the fair and proper measure of each citizen's contribution to gov-
ernment.
Thus, the strategy for those who desire to maintain the integ-
rity and purpose of a progressive income tax system is becoming
increasingly clear. To prevent the use of or to effect the removal
of tax preferences in order to attain a fair tax system, tax reformers
must not only point out the deleterious effects of tax incentives,
but must also point the way to funding a solution of the social need
giving rise to the demand for tax expenditures. This requires that
the tax purist be able to identify and quantify the contours of the
demand being made in each area of social need and suggest alter-
natives which will satisfy these desiderata while preserving a fair
income tax system.
It is instructive to examine the use of tax incentives in three
areas of social need—education, pollution, and housing—and to ana-
lyze the impact of those provisions in light of the tax expenditure
concept. If the above analysis is correct, this discussion should sug-
gest alternative solutions which will meet the dual moral imperative:
a fair tax system, and federal financial assistance to meet these spe-
cific social problems.
II. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION
Present tax laws provide federal financial assistance to educa-
tion at several different levels. A charitable contribution deduction
is granted to individuals who contribute to educational institutions."
Tax exemption is accorded to qualifying educational organizations."
A personal exemption is accorded to the parents of a student even
though he is over age 18 and has some income of his own." Receipts
constituting scholarships or fellowships are excluded from income."
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170.
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501.
29 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 151(e)(1)(B)(ii).
3° Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117.
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This article will focus primarily upon the most significant federal
tax expenditure for higher education—the charitable contribution
deduction.
The charitable contribution deduction clearly constitutes a tax
expenditure. A $100 cash gift to his college by an individual in the
70 percent bracket is equivalent to an expenditure by the federal
government of $70, with a net cost to the donor of $30. But if a
25 percent bracket taxpayer gives $100 to the same college, the gov-
ernment will only bear $25 of the cost of this gift. An individual
who does not itemize his deductions or who pays no federal income
tax assumes the full burden of his $100 gift.
If one views this system as a matching federal grant system its
inherent irrationality is striking. A direct grant statute modeled on
present tax rules would provide that the federal government would
match the gift of married individuals who have more than $200,000
of income on the basis of $7 for each $3 they contribute to charity.
For those with $52,000 of income, the federal matching formula is
$5 for each $5 donated. If the donor's income is $16,000, for each
$7.50 given, the government would pay $2.50 to the charitable re-
cipient. If this direct matching system were presented to Congress as
the proper incentive for charitable giving, it is safe to predict that
it would receive short shrift. Yet this is precisely the effect of the
present expenditure mechanism embodied in federal income tax laws.
The impact of this system on the tax laws is directly inverse
to the theory of a progressive tax system. The underlying rationale
of present rules is that the more money a person has with which to
make charitable gifts, the less it costs him to make the gift. Con-
versely, the less money he has with which to make charitable gifts,
the more out-of-pocket expense he must absorb.
The situation is aggravated when gifts are made in the form of
appreciated property. In this transaction, not only is a deduction
granted for the full fair market value of the property, but the in-
come represented by the gain is not subject to tax. This combination
of exemption of income plus full deduction produces even more pe-
culiar results as an expenditure policy. For example, if a 70 percent
bracket donor makes a gift of property worth $100 with a basis of
zero, the government grants a $70 tax reduction via the deduction
plus a $35 tax reduction in the form of a forgiven capital gains tax.'
A corresponding direct expenditure system would look as follows: If
a married donor with more than $200,000 of income makes a gift of
$30 to charity, the government will make a grant to the charity of
81 This example assumes that the donor has more then $50,003 in gain and the
provisions of § 1201 for taxable years beginning in 1972 apply.
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$70 and return $35 of tax to the donor. In other words, the govern-
ment will pay $105 to encourage a $100 gift to charity if the donor
is in the highest tax bracket. On the other hand, a married donor
with $52,000 of income wishing to benefit his college in the amount
of $100 would have to make a gift of $50 to charity, which the gov-
ernment would match with $50, and would return only $25 to the
donor. In this latter case, it costs the government only $75 to induce
the $100 charitable donation.
This analysis not only indicates the unfairness inherent in the tax
rules governing charitable gifts of appreciated property, but also
delineates the unequal treatment given to gifts of cash, even though
the dollar benefit the charity receives is identical. The difference in
treatment in terms of direct expenditure analysis is that the donor
of appreciated property pays no tax on the income from which the
gift is paid, whereas the donor of cash makes his gift out of after-tax
income.
Tax expenditure analysis thus demonstrates the irrationality
and unfairness of the present system of providing tax incentives to
education through the charitable contribution deduction. Why then
is such a system continued? The answer can be found in the testi-
mony of the colleges and universities, and some wealthy donors, before
the Senate Finance Committee in connection with proposed changes
in the tax reform bill" affecting the charitable contribution deduc-
tion." Attention in the Senate primarily was concentrated on proposed
changes in the treatment of gifts of appreciated property and on
indirect methods of limiting the benefits of the charitable contribution
deduction provision, such as through the minimum tax proposal."
Colleges and universities presented a highly organized front in
the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. Their position
can be simply stated." Education is of critical importance to the
social, economic and political progress of the United States; institu-
tions of higher learning must have ever increasing funds to meet edu-
cational needs; the charitable contribution deduction helps provide
funds. Therefore, colleges and universities oppose any change in tax
82 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
88 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 2009-20 (1969) (statement of John D. Rockefeller III) (herein-
after cited as Hearings]; id. at 2041-73 (statement of Dr. Ernest L. Wilkinson, President,
Brigham Young University, on behalf of the American Association of Independent
College and University Presidents) ; id. pt. 4, at 3342-67 (statement of Hon. Douglas
Dillon, former Secretary of the Treasury).
84 See H 301-02 of H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), as passed by the House
of Representatives. See also H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 77-80 (1969).
85 The testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, which the following dis-
cussion summarizes, appears at Hearings, pt. 3, at 2009-20, 2041-2277, 2493-2664.
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provisions which might result in reduced amounts being donated to
them by private individuals.
Colleges and universities made two basic arguments to support
their contention that changes in the rules for the charitable contribu-
tion deduction would impair their financial condition. First, they
argued that the tax deduction generally, and the special treatment
for gifts of appreciated property in particular, constitute incentives
to charitable giving. They concluded that any diminution in the tax
incentive would correspondingly reduce funds available for educa-
tion. Second, they asserted that private support of education is im-
portant in a pluralistic society, and that the tax laws should encourage
participation by the private sector. It is important to evaluate these
arguments since they highlight the dimensions that a more rational
federal tax policy must assume.
In 1967 individuals claimed charitable contribution deductions
of over $9 billion. 36 Of this amount, 92 percent was given in the form
of cash and only 8 percent in the form of property. These figures
reflect only gifts by persons who itemized their deductions; additional
gifts by persons claiming the standard deduction are estimated to be
approximately $4 billion." Identification of the disincentive argument
by charities is difficult. It is clear that the tax laws provide no incen-
tive for giving by non-itemizers. It is reasonable to expect that their
charitable gifts would remain the same regardless of changes in the
deduction. Some studies have also indicated that nontax considera-
tions primarily motivate donors who itemize in income tax brackets
below 40 percent."
Thus, the disincentive argument of the colleges and universities
would appear to be confined largely to taxpayers above the 40 per-
cent bracket, and to the special treatment accorded gifts of appreciated
property. Less than 1 5 million taxpayers out of over 27 million con-
tributors fall in these high income brackets, but they contribute about
one-fourth of the $9 billion in itemized charitable contributions and
almost two-thirds of the gifts of appreciated property."
Colleges and universities maintain that they would be seriously
affected by any changes because they are especially reliant on large
gifts by wealthy donors and on gifts of appreciated property. The
present difficulty is that there is no reliable quantification of the dis-
36 Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treas. Dep't, 1966. Statistics of Income, Indi-
vidual Income Tax Returns 50 (1968).
37 This estimate is based on data appearing in U.S. Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform
Studies and Proposals, pt. 2, at 194-200 (reprinted by House Ways and Means Com-
mittee & Senate Finance Committee 1969) [hereinafter cited as Studies].
38 C. Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax 62 (1960).
39 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 36, at 50.
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incentive effect on these donors of changes in the tax rules. It is
uncertain whether charitable contributions would be reduced by $1,
$.50 or $.25 for each $1 of additional taxes that were required to be
paid. Presumably there is a role for systems analysis in this situation
to provide some insight as to the probable effects of any proposed
changes. What is significant for the present discussion is that this
possibility of reduced contributions to colleges and universities must
be taken into account as one parameter of any proposed new sys-
tem of encouraging charitable giving.
The second tenet of the colleges and universities is that private
philanthropy must be encouraged through the tax system to insure
pluralism in our total educational effort. But the American Council on
Education testified that only 1 percent of all donors gave 75 percent of
the gifts to higher education in 1967-1968. 4° Since these gifts obvi-
ously come from the wealthiest members of society, from the stand-
point of tax reformers it appeared that the tax preferences involved
in the charitable deduction rules were a very high price to pay for a
very minimal amount of pluralism. Nonetheless, any proposal for
change must reflect the underlying concern that private individuals
need to be involved in and have the right to select the objects of their
philanthropy.
In sum, opponents of tax expenditures through the charitable
contribution deduction argue that the present system is defective on
several counts. For the vast majority of givers, the deduction is sim-
ply a windfall which pays them to make gifts they would make in any
event. In some cases, the cost of the gift to the government is greater
than the amount the charity receives. As such, the federal expendi-
ture is inefficient and wasteful. The present tax rules are inequitable,
giving a larger benefit to the wealthy than to lower income taxpayers
and manifesting a marked preference for those who can make their
charitable gifts by using appreciated property as compared to those
who must use cash
Proponents of present tax incentives for charitable giving es-
sentially are concerned that badly needed sources of revenue for
education will be removed with elimination of the tax preferences.
They want to encourage private involvement in education and to be
free of the vagaries of government control and the annual appro-
priations process.
In the consideration of the Tax Reform Bill these two positions
passed each other without making constructive contact. Tax reformers
reacted adversely to the general refusal of charities to consider seri-
ously the inequities inherent in present tax rules. On the other hand,
40 Hearings, pt. 3, at 2186 (statement of Prof. Julian Levi, University of Chicago).
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colleges and universities seemed generally to conclude that insistence
on removal of tax preferences implied a lack of concern for educa-
tion." Nonetheless, out of this debate emerges the contours of a
viable new system that can satisfy the legitimate concerns of each
of these positions.
From the standpoint of tax equity, the answer is that the deduc-
tion for charitable contributions must be eliminated, and that trans-
fers of appreciated property will constitute taxable transactions. But,
as suggested above, advancement of this proposition imposes the re-
sponsibility on tax reformers of proposing an alternative means of
meeting the social problem—here education. It was the failure to
provide such an alternative that led to the defeat of many of the ad-
mittedly limited reforms advocated for the Tax Reform Bill. But
the testimony of colleges and universities and of philanthropists sug-
gests at least the conditions which must be met by such non-tax
alternatives. First, educational institutions must be assured that
present and projected levels of support equal that which they can
reasonably anticipate from the present tax expenditure system. Sec-
ond, the process must be free of federal control. Third, private donors
must have a voice in determining the recipients of charitable support.
These criteria can be met without impairing the equity of the income
tax system.
The proposal suggested for consideration is a shift to a direct
federal matching grant system. A formula would be employed through
which the federal government would automatically match all or a
portion of a contributor's gift to charity. The proper index for the
formula would appear to be the proportion of a taxpayer's total
economic income that he gives to charity. For example, the new sys-
tem could provide that if a person gives 10 percent of his total eco-
nomic income to charity, the Treasury will match his gift, dollar for
dollar. The taxpayer who gives 5 percent of his income to charity
would have one-half of his gift matched by the Treasury, and so on.
Detailed analysis would be required to determine the exact formula
needed to provide funds to charity of the magnitude required and
at a level consistent with projected federal revenue needs.
Such a system would introduce equity into our federal tax sys-
tem while still encouraging charitable giving, for, under the proposal,
the low income individual who gives a large share of his income to
charity will have his gift matched on the same basis as a wealthy
individual who gives the same percentage of his income. As noted
above, this is not the result under the present tax expenditure system.
The proposal, of course, means that charitable institutions re-
41 See, e.g., the exchanges at Hearings, pt. 3, at 2045-50, 2192-94, 2237-43.
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ceiving gifts from the vast majority of givers who are not tax moti-
vated will benefit more from these gifts than they do at the present
time. There is no reason to expect that changes in the tax rules will
result in a significant reduction in the level of giving by these indi-
viduals. On the other hand, educational institutions may derive some-
what less benefit from gifts by wealthy individuals. For example, a
$100 gift by a 70 percent taxpayer now costs him only $30. If we
assume that he will reduce his gift with the removal of the tax benefit
to his present $30 cost, his college could only get a maximum of $60
if a dollar for dollar matching system were adopted as the upper
limit of the Treasury contribution. To transfer the same $100 to
his college, this taxpayer would have to increase the out-of-pocket
cost of his gift to at least $50.
To preserve individual choice and involvement, each donor would
be entitled to designate on his tax return the organizations which
are to receive the matching gifts triggered by his donations. The
donor could also specify the amounts each designated institution
is to receive. Further, a permanent appropriation could be provided
for the federal matching funds triggered by the formula. This would
provide certainty to charities and freedom from problems of the an-
nual appropriations process. 42
A liberal period of time would be required during the transition
to the new system to insure stable levels of receipts for charitable
organizations. In addition, during the transition period, one devia-
tion from equity might be considered to ease the problems of institu-
tions of higher education which rely heavily on large gifts. The top
matching formula might be triggered by any gift in excess of a sub-
stantial minimum amount, regardless of the percentage of the donor's
income represented by the gift.
The proposed system would facilitate consideration of the rela-
tive priorities society might wish to place on various charitable activ-
42 Federal incentives for charitable giving, recast in this mold, present rather interest-
ing implications for the role of private foundations. If private foundations were to
continue to qualify as charitable recipients, Congress would be squarely faced with the
implications of the following pattern: A wealthy donor could create a private foundation.
Upon making a gift to that foundation, he would trigger a matching grant by the federal
government to his foundation. The federal portion would then be fully controlled by the
trustees of the foundation who would only be required to meet the income payout and
other foundation rules passed by Congress. It is interesting to speculate whether Congress
would acquiesce in a system that permanently placed federal funds in the hands of a
foundation created by the donor and insulated from publicly determined priorities. But,
of course, as Senator Gore of Tennessee pointed out in his proposal to limit the tax
exempt life of foundations to 40 years, this is precisely the system we now have via the
tax expenditure mechanism. 115 Cong. Rec. S. 12,232-5 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1969). The
direct matching proposal at least permits Congress to face squarely the implications
of channeling charitable contributions through the medium of private foundations.
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ities. If education is of first priority, then a higher matching formula
could be provided for it than for a lower priority charitable activity.
The present tax system accomplishes this result in a rough fashion by
placing differing limits on deductible contributions, but the direct
matching system would enable Congress to make more sophisticated
judgments.
This proposal seems to satisfy the requirements of tax reformers
and educational institutions alike. Further analysis is, of course, re-
quired. The attempt here is simply to provide a framework within
which those concerned with two vital social needs can cooperatively
achieve their respective goals—tax equity, and insuring funds suffi-
cient to meet our pressing educational requirements.
III. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR POLLUTION CONTROL
With the quality of the environment occupying stage center of
our social and political awareness, demands for funding of antipollution
efforts through tax incentives are inevitable. Tax expenditures spe-
cifically for antipollution efforts had their genesis with the suspension
of the investment credit in 1966 when an exception was made continu-
ing the 7 percent investment credit for pollution control facilities
during the suspension period.' Pollution control facilities also were
granted an exception to the repeal of the tax exempt status of industrial
development bonds in 1968." Thus it was not too surprising that, when
President Nixon recommended repeal of the 7 percent investment
credit in April, 1969," testimony submitted to the House Ways and
Means Committee suggested that an exception be made for pollution
abatement facilities."
The Treasury and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) opposed any exception to preserve the investment
credit for antipollution devices. From the Treasury standpoint, of
course, creation of this exception would merely invite other exceptions,
and thus erode the effectiveness of repeal of the investment credit as
an antiinflationary measure. But Secretary Finch, in a letter to the
Committee, spelled out objections to such an exception from the
standpoint of the nation's pollution control efforts. 47 He argued that
the tax expenditure would not be a stimulus to pollution abatement.
43 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 1508, 1511-12, formerly
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48(h) (12).
44 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103(c)(4)(F).
45 Message from the President of the United States Regarding Tax Reform, H.R.
Doc. No. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
46 See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Presi-
dent's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit and to Extend Tax Surcharge and
Certain Excise Tax Rates, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158, 167, 193, 202, 309 (1969).
47 Id. at 129-30.
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Since the necessary equipment yields little or no return, alternative
uses of funds would be economically more attractive. Hence any "in-
centive" effect of a tax preference was doubtful. Further, HEW argued,
the prime incentive for industry to engage in pollution abatement
efforts arises from state and local regulatory requirements. Thus, the
tax expenditure was simply paying businesses to do what they would
have to do in any event.
Under this analysis the proposal to provide an investment credit
for pollution control facilities simply amounted to cost-sharing by the
federal government. The testimony before the Ways and Means Com-
mittee by industry representatives by and large confirmed this view.
Virtually without exception private industry representatives argued
that they were being forced by local regulations to install pollution
equipment, that the equipment would not increase profits and was
being installed for the public good, and therefore the public should
bear part of the cost through the mechanism of an investment credit.
Several questions immediately arise. Is the cost sharing really
needed? If so, is industrial investment in depreciable hardware the best
form of investment for effective pollution control? And, finally, who
should properly bear the cost of cleaning up industrial pollution?
Secretary Finch pointed out that the cost to industry of effective
pollution control efforts is quite small." A 1967 Report by an inter-
agency Working Committee on Economic Incentives entitled Cost
Sharing With Industry?, concluded that the annual cost of effective
air and water pollution abatement would be less than one third percent
of value-added by all manufacturing and electric power industries."
This relatively small cost did not appear to warrant federal cost-
sharing.
The federal subsidy through the investment credit was also con-
sidered an inefficient and, in the long run, possibly undesirable ap-
proach to pollution abatement. The investment credit could only be
available for investment in end-of-the-line hardware. Thus, there would
be a marked incentive for businesses to use hardware as a solution to
every pollution problem, precluding concentration on changes in fuel,
processing techniques, or changes in raw materials utilization, none of
which could qualify for federal tax cost-sharing funds. Technically,
these latter methods appear to offer sounder long range approaches to
pollution abatement, and Secretary Finch therefore argued that the tax
48 Id. at 129.
49 Cost Sharing With Industry—Summary Report of the Working Committee on
Economic Incentives (Revised) 3 (Nov. 20, 1967). The Working Committee is one of
several committees under the aegis of the Federal Coordinating Committee on the
Economic Impact of Pollution Abatement.
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credit would subsidize the more inefficient and ineffective techniques."
Despite Treasury and HEW opposition, and with no substantive
supporting study, the Ways and Means Committee voted a special
five-year rapid amortization provision for certified pollution control
facilities." Under this provision, a taxpayer could deduct his total cost
in five years even though normal tax depreciation rules would establish
a longer useful life for the property. While this provision was intended
as a substitute for the repeal of the 7 percent investment credit, in-
terestingly enough, some long-lived equipment would have received a
tax benefit from the new rapid write-off provision equal to a 20 percent
investment credit. Through this new provision the tax writing com-
mittee of the House in effect appropriated $400 million annually to
share costs for an effort that from the evidence available needed no
subsidy, and for an approach which would in the long run be ineffective
and inefficient. Further, consideration of pollution efforts by the sub-
stantive congressional committees had indicated that the money would
be better spent on basic research, in assisting state and local govern-
ment efforts." As evidence arises that pollution efforts must be
mounted on a regional basis, the tax incentive becomes even less ap-
propriate. Nevertheless, the Senate also adopted this new tax prefer-
ence, but with changes which cut the annual cost to an estimated $120
million ca
The federal tax expenditure as it emerged in the Act" can be
viewed as an interest-free loan in the amount of the taxes which would
have been paid had normal depreciation been taken for tax purposes
during the five-year rapid write-off period. Repayment of the loan is
effected by taking less than normal depreciation in subsequent years.
This loan is, in effect, available only to those corporations which are
in a profit position; loss corporations must borrow their funds from
commercial sources at prevailing interest rates.
50 Hearings on the President's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit, supra note
46, at 130.
51. Report of the Comm. on Ways and Means to Accompany H.R. 13270, H.R. Rep.
No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 196-200 (1969).
52 Bills introduced by Senator Muskie, for example, direct federal funds to these
areas. See S. 3546, S. 3678, S. 3688, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess (1970).
03 Report of the Comm. on Finance to Accompany H.R. 13270, S. Rep. No. 552, 91st
Cong., 1st Seas 248-52 (1969). Under the Senate version, the 5-year amortization is
allowed only for the proportion of the cost of the facility attributable to the first 15
years of its normal useful life. If a facility has a normal life of 15 years or less the
entire cost is eligible for the 5-year write-off. If, however, the useful life is more than
15 years, the taxpayer treats his facility as 2 separate facilities. One facility (representing
the cost attributable to the first 15 years of its life) is eligible for the 5-year write-off
while the other facility (representing the remaining cost) can be depredated concurrently
by regular methods over its entire useful life.
54 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 704(a), 1 US. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 729-32 (1969) (codified at Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, 169).
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Alternatively, this tax expenditure can be viewed as a federal loan
program for the full capital cost of the facilities, but at a reduced
interest rate. So analyzed, this results in a reduction in the corpora-
tion's borrowing costs by some 2 to 3 percent depending on the useful
life of the property and the amount the corporation can otherwise earn
on its money." Again, the loss corporation receives no reduction in its
interest costs; it must pay the going rate of interest.
As a means of financing the antipollution effort, the five-year
rapid write-off provision shares all the infirmities noted by Secretary
Finch with respect to granting an investment credit for pollution abate-
ment facilities. From the standpoint of the tax system, the special
provision also produces problems. The corporate tax system does not
rely on a progressive rate structure. Nonetheless tax incentives in the
corporate system produce inequities just as in the individual tax
system.
The fundamental precept of the corporate tax system is that a
flat rate of tax will be imposed on corporate net income. Those corpora-
tions with the same net income should pay the same tax. But the rapid
amortization provision violates this precept. Assume that Corporation
A has depreciable assets which are not pollution control facilities, and
after all deductions, has taxable income of $500,000. Corporation B
has an identical cost basis in depreciable assets, part of which are
certified pollution control facilities. In the absence of the rapid amor-
tization provision, Corporation B would have the same taxable income
as Corporation A and pay the same federal income tax. Solely because
of the special tax provision, Corporation B will now pay a lower tax
for five years than Corporation A. And because the federal loan is
interest free, this represents a permanent financial gain for Corpora-
tion B relative to Corporation A.
Thus, under the definition offered above, the rapid write-off pro-
vision is a tax expenditure. It creates differing tax results on a basis
wholly apart from proper rules of accounting for the cost of producing
income. Like other tax expenditures, it is irrational in operation. It
assists only profitable polluters; the loss corporation gets no federal
cost-sharing solely because it cannot meet the basic requirement for
obtaining the interest free federal loan, namely profit. Even though
a loss corporation might demonstrate that it faces a more serious
pollution control problem than its profitable counterpart it would get
no federal aid through the tax system.
Similarly, large corporations would be entitled to a larger loan
55 Address by Douglas B. Wilson, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Tax Institute of
America Symposium, Princeton, N.J., Nov. 21, 1969.
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than small corporations." The tax benefit of rapid amortization is, for
a small corporation, only 22 percent of the amount written off. A large
corporation benefits to the extent of 48 percent of its write-0M°' Again,
the amount of the government loan has no relation to the problem of
pollution control or indeed no necessary correlation to the size of the
business operation, since heavy losses could conceivably place a very
large business in the lower tax bracket.
Congress, interestingly enough, recognized the adverse impact on
tax equity of the new tax preference by providing that the new min-
imum tax be applied to the excess of rapid amortization over straight-
line depreciation." The minimum tax might thus be viewed as the
"interest" which the government is charging for its "loan." But again
the amount and incidence of this "tax interest" is highly arbitrary and
erratic in operation. Also, Congress was sufficiently concerned about
the provision to provide an automatic termination date in 5 years in
order to insure review and evaluation of the rule.
Whatever the uneven operation of tax expenditures for pollution
abatement, it is clear that the tax expenditure is based on the assump-
tion that the public should bear a significant part of the cost of indus-
trial pollution abatement. Tax expenditure analysis thus raises the
question who should bear this cost. Industry representatives argued
before the Senate Finance Committee that pollution abatement was
for the public good and that the public should therefore bear the
cost." Indeed some proposals for additional tax benefits submitted to
the Committee would have resulted in the public bearing over 46
percent of the capital cost of industrial pollution abatement facilities 0 0
The public is already providing cost-sharing benefits to industry
in programs, quite apart from special tax incentives, through research,
low cost loans and direct grants. Many economists feel that the direct
cost of abating industrial pollution should be borne largely by in-
dustry!" Thus, expenditures for pollution control efforts would either
be absorbed by the corporations themselves or be passed on to con-
sumers of the industrial products in the form of higher prices. If
industry is presently keeping its costs or prices down because it is
using the public air and water in a manner which creates pollution,
56 A small corporation is herein defined as a corporation with taxable income of
less than $25,000, see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11(d).
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
58 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 624 (1969) (codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 57(a) (4)).
59 See, e.g., Hearings, pt. 2 at 1247 (statement of Lester W. Brann, Jr., Exec. V.P.
III. State Chamber of Commerce); id. at pt. 6, at 5223 (statement of Donald H. Glea-
son, National Ass'n of Mfrs.).
GO Wilson, supra note 55.
• 61 Hearings, pt. 5, at 4714 (statement of Dan Throop Smith, Professor of Finance
Emeritus, Harvard University).
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then this economic view would appear to be correct. The cost of proper
use of air and water should be borne either by investors in the industry
in the form of lower profits or by the consumers of the products in the
form of higher prices. These are the groups which benefit from the use
of the public air and water, and they should absorb the costs of utiliz-
ing these natural resources in a manner that does not create an un-
acceptable level of pollution.
President Nixon's pollution proposals appear to have accepted
this analysis in part.' In the proposal for creation of adequate munic-
ipal waste treatment plants, the President has suggested that federally
funded plants impose user charges on industries so that the cost of
treating industrial waste will be absorbed by industry. In effect this
proposal reflects a policy decision that the general public should not
be required to bear the costs of industrial pollution abatement.
Some have gone further and called for imposition of effluent
charges and emission fees on those industries creating pollution at
levels above standards determined to be acceptable.° The charges
would have to be set at such a level that an industry could not eco-
nomically afford to continue polluting air or water. In other words, the
charges must be so burdensome that industry is required to convert to
lower cost pollution abatement practices. The financial burden of in-
dustrial pollution control under this plan is also placed on industry.
Again, either the investor or the consumer will bear these costs, with
the relative burden that each group absorbs varying from industry to
industry. Senator Proxmire has introduced legislation to implement
a national system of effluent charges to combat water pollution." Some
localities have tried such a system, apparently with considerable suc-
cess.° One of the advantages claimed for a national system is that it
provides financing for concerted regional attacks on pollution, a step
which pollution experts now generally consider essential6°
From the economists' standpoint, there is considerable agreement
that the cost of dealing with industrial pollution is properly placed on
industry. Charges for keeping the public air and water free of indus-
trial pollution are simply a part of the cost of doing business, which
costs industry has improperly avoided thus far at the expense of the
62 President Nixon's Message on the Environment, H.R. Doc. No. 225, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1970), also appearing in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News No. 2, at 112-23.
63 See 115 Cong. Rec. S. 14,971-77 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1969) (remarks of Senator
Proxmire).
64 S. 3181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
65 115 Cong. Rec. S. 14,973 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1969) (remarks of Senator Prox-
mire).
66 See S. 3471, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess (1970) (the Nixon Administration bill) and
S. 3687, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1970) (Senator Muskie's bill), which incorporate this
view.
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public. However, technology and politics have not yet reached a point
where the economists' solution can be satisfactorily implemented.
Difficult measurement and standards problems must be resolved by
those dealing with the technical problems of pollution. Politically,
there is yet little agreement on the proper allocation of the cost of
controlling industrial pollution among the public, the investors and
consumers. Further, the contours of effective political action are still
evolving to determine the proper roles of federal, state and local and
regional political authority. Undoubtedly, the foregoing reasons were
responsible for President Nixon's omission of any mention of effluent
charges or emission fees from his pollution control program, although
the 1967 Interagency Study Group had recommended such action as
an appropriate step, at least on an experimental basis."
The contours of a substitute program for present expenditures
for pollution control facilities do not emerge as clearly as in the case
of a substitute program for tax provisions affecting charitable giving.
The absence of a viable alternative to the tax incentive was reflected
in the debate on the Tax Reform Bill of 1969. Proponents of strong
pollution control efforts, such as Senator Muskie, recognized the ad-
verse impact on the tax laws of the rapid amortization rule. But they
saw no alternative available which would insure direction of federal
funds to this high priority social problem. Hence, they opposed any
effort to strike this new tax preference from the bill."
Despite the lack of complete clarity, certain features of an alterna-
tive approach to the present tax expenditure emerge. First, the special
provision for rapid amortization of the cost of pollution control facil-
ities in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 should be repealed. It violates the
integrity of the corporate tax system and it is an inappropriate and
ineffective expenditure of federal funds for abatement of industrial
pollution. Second, a significant portion of costs of clearing industrial
pollution should be absorbed by industry and not by the general public,
whether through tax or direct expenditures. The present tax incentive
is inconsistent with this principle. Third, the costs of reducing indus-
trial pollution to acceptable levels appear well within the capacity of
most industry groups to absorb without undue burden on profits or
excessive upward pressure on prices. In the case of loss or marginal
profit situations low cost loans should be employed. Tax incentives
are again undesirable since they provide maximum aid to industries
needing no financial assistance, and little or no aid to those needing
assistance. Economic analysis indicates that a system of effluent and
emission charges, both to control pollution and to help finance the
87 Cost Sharing with Industry, supra note 49, at 34-5.
88 See Senate floor debate on H.R. 13270, 115 Cong. Rec. S. 16,202-207 (daily ed.
Dec. 9, 1969).
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general pollution effort, should be implemented. Here the dimensions of
the political and technological response are still unclear. However, the
use of tax incentives appears to offer little assistance in resolving these
problems, and probably will prove a positive hindrance. Finally, ade-
quate political and financing techniques must be developed if regional
approaches to pollution abatement are to be employed.
IV. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR HOUSING
The contours of an alternative to tax incentives for charitable
donations have emerged with some clarity from tax expenditure anal-
ysis. In the case of pollution abatement, the dimensions of an alterna-
tive to tax preferences are developing but are not yet in sharp focus.
In the final area of social need under consideration in this article,
housing, the criteria for an alternative to present tax preferences for
real estate investment are shadowy at best. Tax expenditure analysis
in this area so far points mostly in the direction of questions to be con-
sidered rather than definitive answers.
Present tax laws contain a number of preferential provisions to
encourage investment in housing. At the level of individual home
ownership, the primary tax benefit is the deduction for interest on
home mortgages 6 9 Mention has previously been made of the upside-
down effect of this provision, whereby home ownership for the wealthy
receives a much greater federal boost than homeownership for the
poor. The deduction for local property taxes" has a similar effect. By
contrast, Section 235 of the Federal Housing Ace is a program of
direct federal financial assistance to facilitate home ownership by low
income families.
Attention on the nation's housing needs has primarily focused on
the shortage of low and moderate income rental housing. Programs
under Sections 221 72 and 230 of the Federal Housing Act are directed
specifically at this target group. Several of the provisions in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 reflect a similar concern."
The extent of the housing problem facing the United States cannot
be overstated. Although it has been estimated that there are presently
some 70 million housing units in the country, over 7 million of these
are classified as substandard." With the recent economic decline in
the housing industry, new housing starts as of January, 1970, were
69 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163.
70 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 164.
71 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (Supp. IV, 1969).
72 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (Supp. IV, 1969).
78 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV, 1969).
74 See Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 521, 910, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 706-13,
793-98 (1969) (codified at ht. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 167, 1250(a),(b), 1039, 1250(d)).
75 Hearings, pt. 5, at 4904 (statement of Charles Davenport).
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down to about 1 million per year." Yet the nation will need some 26
million new units by 1978." This failure to provide an adequate supply
of decent housing bears most heavily on low and moderate income
families.
Much of the discussion during consideration of the Tax Reform
Act with respect to tax provisions affecting real estate arose out of the
very legitimate concern that the level of federal funding to encourage
development of more low and middle income housing must be in-
creased." The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) therefore campaigned vigorously not only to retain present
tax preferences for housing, but to provide new ones for lower income
residential property."
Tax reformers shared HUD's concern with the housing problem.
But they were also concerned with the inequities the various prefer-
ences create in the tax system, and seriously questioned whether the
tax expenditure approach was an effective and efficient utilization of
admittedly limited federal funds."
The principal tax incentive for investment in rental residential
real property is the right to compute the depreciation deduction on one
of the permissible accelerated methods, notably the double declining
balance method." This special provision permits the equity investor to
recover much more of his investment in the early years of the life of
the property than he otherwise could under normal straight line or
sinking fund depreciation.' The Tax Reform Act retained this priv-
ilege for investment in residential housing,83 while cutting back on the
benefits of accelerated depreciation for nonresidential real property."
78 Joint Economic Comm., Economic Indicators 21 (April 1970). Housing starts
rose to 1.383 million by March, 1970.
77 Hearings, pt. 5, at 4904 (statement of Charles Davenport).
78 See Senate floor debate on H.R. 13270, 115 Cong. Rec. S. 16,343-351 (daily ed.
Dec. 10, 1969).
72 Senate Comm. on Finance Press Release (Oct. 21, 1969).
80 See note 78 supra.
81 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b) (2). Under this method, the taxpayer is al-
lowed to deduct twice the straight-line rate as applied against the adjusted basis of the
property.
82 The sinking fund depreciation method requires a person to deduct a lesser amount
of depreciation in the earlier years than in the later years of the property's normal
useful life.
83 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 707-08 (1969)
(codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(j)(2)).
84 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 706-07 (1969)
(codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(j) (1)). Depreciation on new commerdal
and industrial construction is limited to 150% declining balance. Depredation of newly
acquired used commercial and industrial property is limited to straight-line depredation.
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 708 (1969) (codified at
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(j)(4)).
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Quite obviously, the intent of Congress was to encourage increased
investment in housing.
The difficulty with this congressional response is that the direct
impact of the tax incentive is confined to the investor group. No direct
benefit is conferred on the other members of the typical real estate
quadriad: the developer, the financing institution, and the tenants.
Renters, for example, get no tax benefit equivalent to the deductions
for interest and property taxes available to homeowners."
But even within the investor group, accelerated depreciation has
the inverted effect characteristic of other tax incentive provisions; the
tax provision is more beneficial to the person who presumably needs it
least—the wealthy taxpayer. Here, the high-bracket individual uses the
artificially high deduction in the early years of his investment to create
a "tax loss" to shelter his other income from tax. For example, the
1968 Treasury Studies on Tax Reform revealed that, out of a group of
thirteen wealthy real estate investors, nine paid no federal income tax
and two reduced their tax liability to less than $25, due to the depre-
ciation deduction. One taxpayer with $7.5 million in income over a
seven-year period paid an effective rate of tax of only 11 percent s'
Theoretically, it is true that the investor using accelerated depreciation
will pay more taxes in later years as his depreciation falls below what
it normally would have been under conventional depreciation methods.
In effect, the use of accelerated depreciation is a loan by the govern-
ment in the early years in the amount of the tax saving. This loan is
repaid by the higher taxes in later years, but the loan bears no interest.
And if the investor continues to expand his investments in real estate,
the loan itself may never be repaid.
The value of an interest free loan varies directly with the tax-
payer's bracket, the useful life of the property, and the rate of return
the taxpayer could expect if he invested in other property. Assume,
for example, that two taxpayers, one in a 70 percent bracket and the
other in a 30 percent bracket, who can each earn 10 percent on their
money, invest in the same apartment house. The federal government
will through the tax system, insure a more profitable investment to the
higher bracket investor than to the lower bracket investor. If the
accelerated depreciation provision were recast as a direct loan program,
the resulting statute would provide that HUD is authorized to loan
funds to 70 percent bracket taxpayers at a lower rate of interest than
would be available to borrowers in the lower brackets. It is difficult
65 For a general discussion of this problem, see Kindahl, Housing and the Federal
Income Tax, 13 Nat'l Tax J. 376 (1960) ; White & White, Horizontal Inequality in the
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and Tenants, 18 Nat'l Tax J. 225
(1965).
86 1968 Treasury Studies on Tax Reform 443-44 [hereinafter cited as Studies].
891
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to conceive that HUD would urge Congress to enact such a system
directly, but its sponsorship of tax incentives produced the same result.
The provision for accelerated depreciation suffers other defects
when viewed as a program to solve low income housing needs. It is also
available for investors in luxury housing. Standing alone, therefore,
the provision would seem to offer little inducement for investors to
enter the low income housing field. Problems of neighborhood deterio-
ration, collection problems, high property taxes and lack of adequate
insurance protections .' would appear to create a strong bias for opting
to invest in high income housing, since the benefits of accelerated de-
preciation are equally available. Furthermore, the present tax provi-
sion permits no direction of federal funds to areas of greatest need.
Creation of additional housing in New York City—where the vacancy
rate is less than one percent—gets no higher priority than housing
development in areas of the country with less acute housing needs.
Another problem with the use of accelerated depreciation as an
incentive for housing investment is the difficulty of ascertaining who
does or should ultimately benefit from this expenditure. Does the tax
preference simply operate as a floor on the profit margin of the in-
vestor, or is it reflected in part in lower rents than would otherwise be
charged, so that tenants may be said to derive some benefit? In either
case, just how much money is the government putting into each trans-
action? Would Congress authorize a direct financial assistance pro-
gram to either group that has the same features as the present tax
expenditure program?
Other difficult questions must be also resolved. Does accelerated
depreciation simply constitute a windfall to the investor group? Some
experts in the housing field assert that no incentive is needed to attract
capital to the real estate field. Market demand, they assert, is sufficient
to generate the needed funds. Rather, they insist, the real problems
inhibiting development of an adequate housing supply are to be found
in inequitable property tax structures, zoning regulations, and local
building codes." To the extent this analysis is correct, the tax incentive
rewards actions which investors would have taken in any event and
diverts funds from other priority areas
Another difficult problem arises in deciding which group in the
typical real estate transaction should receive federal financial aid in
order to make the most efficient use of available funds. Typically, the
housing development transaction will involve four parties: the builder,
87 This problem has been partially solved by federal reinsurance and state pooling
arrangements. For an exhaustive study of these recent statutory solutions, see Com-
ment, Insurance in Urban Core Areas: An Analysis of Recent Statutory Solutions, 10
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 650 (1969).
88 Hearings, pt. 5, at 4904, 4905 (Statement of Charles Davenport).
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the financier, the equity investor group, and the tenants. Should direct
financial aid be given to builders in the form of "seed money" to reduce
building costs? Should programs be expanded to encourage and assist
lending institutions to make low cost loans available to builders or
investors? Or should programs concentrate more on assisting the
tenant group through, for example, rent subsidies? Whatever answer,
or combination of answers, might be developed, it seems clear that the
present tax expenditure of some $250 million per year" through
accelerated depreciation is a clumsy and inefficient vehicle which falls
far short of the sophistication in approach that appears essential.
Given this situation, it was not encouraging that Congress and the
Administration recommended creating more tax expenditures in the
Tax Reform Bill as a means of meeting our low income housing needs.
For example, the Treasury proposed and Congress passed a special
five-year rapid amortization provision for rehabilitation of low and
moderate income housing."
This provision, which is similar in operation to that provided for
investment in pollution control facilities, clearly illustrates the in-
advisability of implementing national housing policy through the tax
writing committees of Congress. It is estimated that under this pro-
vision some $330 million of federal funds will now be committed to
rehabilitation expenditures"' Yet HUD apparently has placed so low
a priority on rehabilitation that it has never recommended to Congress
that funds be directly appropriated for this purpose. And it is obvious
that rehabilitation is not going to produce the 26 million new housing
units presently needed. There were no studies made to determine the
extent of any rehabilitation need, or, if such a need exists, that the
lack of funds is the primary factor affecting failure to rehabilitate
dilapidated housing." Nonetheless, through the tax expenditure route,
several hundred million dollars in federal funds will now be diverted to
a low priority need.
From the standpoint of tax policy, the rehabilitation tax prefer-
ence suffers from all the defects of any tax incentive. Testimony before
the Senate Finance Committee pointed out that the rehabilitation
provision, viewed as a loan program, has the effect of reducing a 70
percent bracket taxpayer's interest costs from 8 percent to 3 percent
on property with a twenty-year life (assuming a 10 percent discount
89 Studies 442.
00 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 709-10 (1969)
(codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(k)). See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k),
35 Fed. Reg. 12401 (1970).
91 115 Cong. Rec. S. 17,593 (daily ed. Dec.•22, 1969).
92 Research Report No. 5 for the National Commission on Urban Problems ex-
plored tax incentives for rehabilitation of older housing but the Commission did not
endorse such a plan.
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rate). On the other hand, a 20 percent bracket taxpayer would have
his interest costs on a similar investment reduced by only one percent."
It is again almost impossible to conceive that Congress would approve
a direct interest subsidy plan with these effects; but through the back
door of the tax laws the country now has just such a program.
In sum, then, Congress through the rehabilitation provision has
instituted a $330 million program which has not been shown to have
any rational relation to the shortage of low income housing, but which
has obvious deleterious effects on the fairness of the federal income
tax system. A point of considerable irony is added when it is noted
that after the Treasury had proposed this provision, it then felt that
the benefits flowing from the rapid write-off should be included as a
tax preference for purposes of the minimum tax." Thus, in a single
bill, Congress has enacted a tax preference which, in another provision,
it has declared to be of unacceptable magnitude. Senator Gore at-
tacked the rapid amortization provision on the Senate floor during
debate of the Tax Reform Bill and attempted to strike it from the
bill." Here again, however, advocates of housing programs apparently
felt that this was an attack on the nation's commitment to meet this
critical social need. These Senators thus opposed deleting these pro-
visions from the bill, although the effort to remove the unfair tax pro-
vision in no way precluded Congress from taking the tax monies so
saved and appropriating them directly for housing needs in a rational
manner consistent with national priorities.
There are also new provisions in the Tax Reform Act" designed
to provide greater tax incentives for investing in the so-called limited
dividend housing programs under Sections 221" and 236" of the
Federal Housing Act. These programs are designed to produce low
income housing by limiting the investors' return to 6 percent and thus
maintaining rents at low levels. Opponents of any changes in the tax
laws relating to accelerated depreciation argued that the tax benefits
to the investor were taken into account in arriving at the 6 percent
figure. This argument may be correct, but, if so, it is certainly difficult
to ascertain the rational basis for the limited dividend provisions. For,
if the tax benefits were determinative, why is a 6 percent return proper
for the 30 percent taxpayer, who gets less tax benefit and hence a
98 Hearings, pt. 5, at 4906 (statement of Charles Davenport).
04 See Pub. L. No. 91-172, 301(a), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 624 (1969)
(codified at Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 57(a) (2)).
95 115 Cong. Rec. S. 16,202-207 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969).
96 See Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 521(b), 910, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 710-11,
792-98 (1969) (codified at Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii), 1039).
94 See note 72 supra.
98 See note 73 supra.
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lower profit margin, as well as for the 70 percent taxpayer who derives
a greater tax benefit from the depreciation deduction? In other words,
one wonders if opponents of any change really believe that Congress
consciously adopted the principle that taking into account the tax
benefit plus the statutory 6 percent, the 70 percent bracket taxpayer
is entitled to a higher rate of return than the 30 percent bracket in-
vestor. Further, if the tax benefit were determinative, it would be more
rational to revise the 6 percent statutory limit upward, or provide
direct federal grants to investors to insure an adequate return on their
investment.
HUD, rather than considering these alternatives, not only resisted
any change in the tax laws, but vigorously pushed for further tax
benefits for investors in limited dividend housing projects. This action
was even more curious in light of the fact that even under existing tax
rules, HUD reportedly had more applications for low income housing
projects than it could fund with available direct appropriations. In
spite of this, Congress accepted the HUD position. Thus, rules as
to recapture of accelerated depreciation are now more liberal for
investments in low income housing projects than for other real estate
ventures." And a taxpayer can defer any recognition of gain if he sells
one low income housing project to the tenants or to a tax exempt orga-
nization and reinvests the proceeds in another low income housing
project 100 The maximum sales price on these government-assisted
housing projects is the amount of the investor's equity plus the amount
of any mortgage and the taxes payable as the result of the sale!" The
theory of the new tax provision is that the purchase price to occupants
of low income housing will be reduced since there will be no federal
income tax due on the sale if the investors reinvest in another similar
project.
Again, this tax approach providing for tax free sales has very
curious results. For example, assume two projects in each of which the
respective investor has $100,000 equity, a $100,000 mortgage, and
would recognize a $50,000 gain on sale of the property. Assume further
that Investor A is in the 70 percent bracket and Investor B is in the
50 percent bracket. In the absence of the new provision the tenants
of Investor A would have to pay $235,000 for their property, and the
tenants of Investor B would pay $225,000. Under the new rule, the
99 See Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(b), 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 710-11 (1969)
(codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1250(a) (1)(C)(ii)).
100 See Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 910, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 79348 (1969)
(codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1039).
101 Report of the Comm. on Finance to Accompany H.R. 13270, S. Rep. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess 292 (1969).
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occupants of Investor A's project would get a $35,000 reduction in
their purchase price, whereas Investor B's tenants would get only a
$25,000 price reduction. In a rational world it may be that these two
occupant groups should pay the same price, but that result would not
likely be predicated on the amount of total income that the investor
happened to earn.
As in the areas of social concern already considered, present tax
incentive policy to encourage development of housing assumes very
strange dimensions when viewed as a federal expenditure policy.
Present tax rules constitute a serious deviation from tax equity. Al-
though the Tax Reform Act modified much of the inequity, it did not
eliminate it. It was the failure of tax reformers to have a viable alter-
native to the present tax expenditure system which prevented further
tax reform. Those whose task it is to promote our national housing
policies felt they had no alternative but to fight for the tax preferences
if they were offered no other avenue by which the same amount of
federal funds would be made available for low and middle income
housing. An inefficient and erratic expenditure funding system was
viewed as preferable to losing funds represented by tax expenditures
altogether.
When one tries to analyze the dimensions of an alternative system,
the considerations which should be controlling are not clear. This un-
certainty is caused primarily by the lack of information with respect
to certain fundamental questions already noted. How much does the
federal government contribute to a given housing project under the
present tax system? How much should the government contribute to
induce developers and investors to invest in housing? Should the
financial aid be focused on a particular segment of the housing quad-
riad, or on some combination? What are the causes of the country's
present failure to provide adequate low income housing through the
private sector? Does the problem derive from a lack of capital, un-
certainty of return, local taxing and regulatory policies, tenant relations
problems, or some combination of these problems? What form of
financial contribution should the government make if these factors can
be analyzed: direct grants, low interest or interest-free loans, or
guarantees?
These foregoing questions have not yet been adequately explored.
This situation makes it even more undesirable to use the tax mech-
anism, since it is known that tax incentive provisions are harmful to
a fair tax system. But until these questions have been answered, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to convince Congress and HUD that tax
reform should proceed further in eliminating tax preferences for
housing.
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CONCLUSION
The tax expenditure concept is a highly useful, analytical tool for
evaluating the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of tax incentive
provisions. This discussion has centered on tax incentives for char-
itable giving, pollution control facilities, and housing. But it is equally
applicable to the tax provisions for depletion allowances, intangible
drilling expenses, deductions for state and local taxes and medical ex-
penses, and the myriad other provisions in the tax code which have
been inserted to achieve nontax purposes.
Tax expenditures cannot be enacted without doing violence to the
integrity of the tax system. If a progressive individual income tax
system mirrors values to which the country is deeply committed, then
proposals to distort that system must be vigorously resisted and present
distortions of the system must be removed.
But tax reformers must constantly bear in mind the validity of
the values which underlie utilization of the tax system to meet social
goals. These values conflict with those inherent in a progressive tax
system whenever the tax system is used to solve social problems. This
potential conflict is resolved within the political system, and if de-
fenders of the tax system have no viable alternatives for financing
programs for meeting pressing social needs outside the tax system,
then political realities will inevitably dictate a compromise. This
compromise will mean that the tax system will be distorted—but not
as much as proposed, and social needs will receive some federal funds
—but not as much nor as effectively spent as desired.
As these compromises pyramid over the years, and as the tax
system becomes more inequitable, confidence in the tax system will
dissipate. The problem is compounded by the fact that social needs
which can only be met with federal funds must rely on the tax system
to collect the bulk of those funds. If public confidence in that tax
system is continuously eroded—albeit ostensibly to achieve highly
praiseworthy social or economic objectives—then this country may
truly face a "taxpayers' revolt" where social needs will not be met,
either by direct or by tax expenditures.
897
